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and  productivity  growth,  however  old  firm  is  still  an  important  stabilizing 
element in determining the trend of the economy. Our analysis also suggests 
that it is insufficient to analyse the competitive process from the point of view 
of new firm entry and incumbent firm growth alone; firms’ exit needs to be 
examined as well.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since 1978, while transforming itself from a centrally planned economy to an 
emerging market economy, China has achieved a 10% average rate of growth in 
GDP, with per capita GDP more than quadrupling. Compared with transition 
economies in Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union China’s 
recent  economic  performance  is  of  course  considerably  more  impressive. 
However, a central paradox of the recent impressive record in China is that it 
has been achieved in the absence of a number of factors commonly deemed to 
be  essential  in  a  successful  transition.  These  include  reasonably  complete 
market liberalization, large-scale privatisation, secure private property rights, 
and  democracy  (Chow,  1997).  Resolution of  the  paradox  is important  when 
assessing the role of current and future reforms. 
 
There are a number of ways in which the effectiveness of the reform process 
can be judged, and the most popular approach has been to compare total factor 
productivity  over  time  and  across  different  firms.  For  a  recent  review  see 
Jefferson et al. (1996). A possible problem with this technique is the perfect 
competition  assumption  underlying  the  production  function,  which  is  not 
applicable, especially in the context of transition economies. Also, given the 
tendency of the small firms and firms in the non-state sector to enter market 
niches, it seems likely that the comparison  may  not be robust to the output 
deflators  employed.  Moreover,  the  general  positive  TFP  growth  conclusion 
drawn  from  such  an  approach  contradicts  the  deteriorating  firm  profitability 
reality (for a general review see Sachs and Woo (2000)). Further, the approach 
represents something of a black box from a micro-dynamic perspective. Is TFP 
growth indicative of what is happening to incumbent firms or the impact of 
entry and exit? As we shall see, this question is particularly important given the 
high rates of “churning” of enterprises and small enterprises in particular. 
 
In this paper, I first tried to estimate instead the effect of economic reform upon 
firms’ efficiency, another indicator of firms’ performance; I found however that 
firms’ efficiency showed a tendency to diverge in the period between 1987 and 
1996. As it was observed, this was contradicting to the result that might have 
been expected of the transition from the former centrally planned economy to 
market  economy.  Therefore, it is  hypothesised in  this  paper that two of  the 
reasons underlying the divergence of technical efficiency are the entry of more 
efficient firms paralleled with the survival of inefficient and value destroying 
firms,  especially  inefficient  state-owned  firms.  However  this  can  only  have 
sustained as long as growth remains strong.  
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As such, an alternative approach to the assessment of the reforms is therefore to 
consider firms’ entry, exit, and survival explicitly and to gauge the extent to 
which the competitive process has improved as a result of the latest bout of 
reform since 1992, dubbed as the transition to the “socialist market economy”, 
while the reform before 1992 had been dubbed as “crossing the river by groping 
the stone”.  This  paper  attempts  to  address the  competitive  selection  process 
directly  by  investigating  the  micro-dynamics  of  entry,  exit,  and  aggregate 
productivity  growth  using  firm  level  data  on  Chinese  manufacturing. 
Specifically, it has three main objectives:  
 
1.  to document the actual patterns of firm entry and exit; 
 
2.  to analyse the post-entry and pre-exit behaviour of Chinese enterprises; 
and  
 
3.  to estimate the contribution of new entries, exits and survival firms to 
aggregate productivity growth.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly surveys the literatures on 
firms’ entry and exit; Section 3 describes the pattern of entry and exit in the 
Chinese  electrical  engineering  industry;  section  4  analyses  the  longitudinal 
performance of surviving and exiting firms; section 5 decomposes the aggregate 
productivity growth; and section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2.  The Entry and Exit in Advanced and Transition Economies 
 
There  is  a  long-standing  interest  in  understanding  firms’  entry  and  exit 
behaviour  and  their  determinants.  Following  Bain’s  (1956)  research  on  the 
process of entry and Edwin Mansfield’s (1962) plea for a greater emphasis on 
the research on the dynamic aspects of industrial organization, there comes an 
explosion of such research. Several theories have been developed to study the 
process that generates each firm’s entry, exit, productivity growth, and market 
share change. They generally related to the process of “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter,  1942).    In  most  models,  each  of  the  above  dimensions  of 
performance  is  depicted  as  the  optimal  behaviour  of  forward-looking 
entrepreneurs with rational expectations but limited information.  
 
Hopenhayn (1992) provides a relatively tractable model of firms’ dynamics. In 
his model, firms differ only in terms of their productivity levels, each of which 
evolves  as  a  random  process  over  time  according  to  an  exogenous  Markov  
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process. He relates the exogenous characteristics of the industry, such as the 
entry  cost,  total  demand  and  the  stochastic  process  for  the  productivity 
parameter to the steady-state distribution of firms and to the process of entry 
and exit. Under such a set up, new firms enter when the distribution from which 
they  draw  their  initial  productivity  level  is  sufficiently  favourable  that  their 
expected future profit stream, net of annual fixed costs, will cover the sunk costs 
of  entry.  Firms  exit  when  they  experience  a  series  of  adverse  productivity 
shocks, driving their expected future operating profits sufficiently low that exit 
is their least costly option.  
 
Hopenhayn’s  (1992)  model  shares  a  number  of  implications  with  other 
representations  of  industrial  evolution  developed  by  Jovanovic  (1982)  and 
Ericson and Pakes (1995). By modeling firms’ evolution as a passive learning 
process,  Jovanovic  (1982)  showed  that  firm  productivity  varies  initially  but 
eventually settles down to a constant level.  As firms only learn about their true 
efficiency by effectively operating and producing, a process of natural selection 
arises whereby less efficient firms leave the industry while more efficient firms 
grow to their optimal size.  This selection mechanism results in younger firms 
being on average smaller and more heterogeneous but less productive than older 
firms. In contrast to this ‘passive learning’ by firms, Ericson and Pakes (1995) 
stressed the importance of ‘active learning’ by firms through investments in 
productivity  enhancement.  Within  their model, a  firm  explores its  economic 
environment actively and invests to enhance its profitability under competitive 
pressure  from  both  within  and  outside  the  industry.  Its  potential  and  actual 
profitability changes over time in response to the stochastic outcomes of the 
firm’s own investment, and those of other actors in the same market. The firm 
grows if successful, and shrinks or exits if unsuccessful. 
 
As we can see from the models, both entry and exit are modelled as the optimal 
responses made by innovative entrepreneurs contingent on the balance between 
future expected return and costs.  At any point in time, an entire distribution of 
firms with different sizes, ages and productivity levels exist, and simultaneous 
entry and exit is the norm. Young firms have not yet survived a shakedown 
process, so they tend to be smaller and to exit more frequently. Large firms are 
the most efficient, on average, so their mark-ups are the largest. Nonetheless, 
despite all the heterogeneity, equilibrium in both Jovanovic’s and Hopenhayn’s 
model  maximize  the  net  discounted  value  of  social  surplus.  Thus  market 
interventions¾such as artificial entry barriers, severance laws, or policies that 
prop  up  dying  firms¾generally  make  matters  worse.  The  exogenous  fixed 
costs¾such as economies of large scale, product differentiation and absolute  
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cost advantages of incumbent firms compared with entrants¾pose barriers to 
both entry and exit. 
 
A number of recent studies have examined empirically the dynamic aspects of 
firm  behaviours  in  the  context  of  advanced  economies¾such  as  Acs  and 
Audretsch’s (1989) and Audretsch’s (1995) work on the U.S Manufacturing, 
Baldwin  and  Gorecki’s  (1989,  1991)  work  on  Canadian  industry,  Geroski’s 
(1991) work on British Manufacturing industry, Dunne’s (1988,1989) work on 
US  manufacturing  industry,  Mata’s  (1993)  work  on  Portugal  Manufacturing 
industry, and Schwalbach (1991) on German  manufacturing industries. They 
found substantial variations in entry and exit rates across industries and that 
entry and exit rates tend to be correlated across industries. They also found that 
entrants and exits are small in terms of both number and  market share, and 
entrants are less likely to be successful. The entry and exit flows are positively 
correlated, and are described as a revolving door at the bottom of the industry 
size distribution (for a general discussion, see Caves (1998)). 
 
In  fact,  the  research  on  industrial  dynamics  has  generalised  the  following 
stylised facts: 
 
￿ Both entry and exits are common; they are large in number but small in size 
(Dunne, 1988; Schwalbach, 1991; Geroski, 1995) 
￿ Exit and entry rates are highly positively correlated (Shapiro, 1987), which 
indicates that entry and exit are part of a process of change in which a large 
number of new firms displace a large number of older firms.  
￿ High rates of entry are often associated with high rates of innovation and 
increases in efficiency. 
￿ The exit rates of new entrants tend to be high (Dunne, 1988, Geroski, 1991), 
and it takes a long time for successful entrants to achieve a size comparable 
to the average incumbent. 
￿ The entry barriers, which also impede exit, tend to be high (Shapiro, 1987; 
Geroski, 1991; Sutton, 1991). 
￿ Firms’ exit rate is closely related to both firms’ size and age (Audretsch, 
1995). 
￿ Entry survival rate varies considerably across industries, however most of 
the total variation in entry across industries and over time is within industry 
variation rather than between industry variation (Geroski, 1995; Audretsch, 
1995; Dunne, 1988). 
 
As  the  formerly  centrally  planned  economies  are  transforming  into  market 
economies, the creation, survival and growth of the newly established firms, and  
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the downsizing and exit of the traditionally large, dominant state-owned firms 
are  vital  to  the  success  of  this  transition  process.  It  is  also  central  to  the 
long-term  health  of  those  economies.  However,  all  the  above  studies  are 
conducted in advanced economies, such as US, UK, Germany, Japan, etc. They 
all assume that firms are profit maximizing and respond in the same way to the 
same market signal, apart from the difference caused by their scale advantage or 
disadvantage.  They  also  assume  the  environment  in  which  firms  operate  is 
homogeneous.  These  assumptions  might  be  quite  appropriate  in  advanced 
economies, but are not appropriate for economies in the transition, where the 
new market economic institutions are still in the making, and the old central 
planning  legacies  remain.  For  example,  in  Russia,  “the  most  productive 
companies not only can't make a buck, but are being driven out of business by 
government-subsidized productivity laggards” (Lewis, 1999). But, at least to my 
knowledge, no such studies have been conducted in the transition economies. 
 
 
3.    Entry  and  Exit  in  the  Electrical  Engineering  Sector  of  Liao  Ning 
Province, China 
 
Using firm level data from the Chinese electrical engineering sector of Liao 
Ning  Province,  this  section  observes  some  measurable  characteristics  of  the 
processes of entry, exit and growth in this representative industrial sector, and 
examines how they have changed with the pace of reform.  
 
3.1  Rationale for Considering Electrical Engineering Industry 
 
The data set we use in this paper covers an almost complete sample of Chinese 
firms in electrical engineering industry from a Northern China Province, Liao 
Ning, over the ten-year period from 1987 to 1996. Liao Ning province used to 
be  the  centre  of  China’s  Manufacturing Industry,  and  is  the  area  where  the 
central planning system was most deeply rooted. Of its 14 cities, there are 5 
coastal  cities,  and  one  of  them,  DaLian,  was  one  of  the  earliest  cities  that 
opened up to the outside world. Moreover, other aspects of reform has made a 
clear impact: China’s first shareholding company is set up in this province, and 
China’s first case of bankruptcy happened here, within the electrical engineering 
industry in fact. Moreover, the reform process led to the fragmentation of the 
domestic market (Young, 2000; Branstetter and Feenstra, 1999), therefore the 
enterprises  reform  in  this  province,  especially  the  reform  of  state-owned 
enterprises,  is  arguably  representative  of  the  enterprise  reform  in  China.  
Electrical engineering industry accounted for about 5% of the province’s gross 
industry output, and it accounted for about 5-6% of the gross output of Chinese  
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electrical  engineering  industry.  This  data  set  contains  3,992  firms,  of  which 
1996 firms exited in the 10-year period.    
 
Electrical  engineering  industry  is  the  sector  where  traditionally  the  SOEs 
dominated, and currently the new entry of non-SOEs is relatively easy, therefore 
the selection of this sector is to some extent representative of the current reform 
situation, with a clear probability that competition has worked over the reform 
period. Some simple statistics of the dataset are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   Numbers of Enterprises in Electrical Engineering Industry, Liao Ning Province 
(1987-1996) 
 
By Size  By Ownership     
Total  Large  Medium  Small  SOEs  COEs  Foreign  Others
 
1987  1092    17    23    1052    134      944    0    14 
1988  1170    19    26    1125    138    1021      1    10 
1989  1246    22    28    1196    149    1087      2      8 
1990  1309    22    29    1258    168    1130      3      8 
1991  1292    26    33    1233    164    1116      6      6 
1992  1418    24    41    1353    183    1210    16      9 
1993  1514    26    49    1439    169    1285     36    24 
1994  1335    28    43    1264    130    1117    42    46 
1995  1334    31    43    1260    129    1132    60    13 
1996  1632    32    51    1549    168    1343    74    47 
 
Notes:  
SOE:   State Owned Enterprises;  
COEs:   Collectivelly Owned Enterprises 
Foreign:  Foreign Owned or Foreign Invested Firms 
Others:   enterprise other than the above three groups, mainly includes domestic private firms 
(including shareholding companies) and state and/or collective and private 
cooperative firms.  
 
Over the ten-year period, the number of firms increased by 540 units; 500 of 
them  are  small  firms,  and  400  of  them  are  COEs.  Foreign  invested  firms, 
including joint ventures and foreign investor-owned firms, increased from 0 in 
1987 to 74 in 1996.  And the growth of both gross industrial output and labour 
productivity  has  been  positive  except  in  1988  and  1990  (see  Figure  1);  the 
employment in this sector has declined from its peak of 268 thousands in 1989 
to 245 thousands in 1995, but in 1996 it increased again to the level of 1989.        
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3.2  Firm’s Efficiency: A DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) Analysis 
In order to estimate whether firms’ efficiency has been improved as the result of 
economic  reform,  we  quantify  firms’  efficiency  by  applying  the  Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  
 
DEA  is  the  most  frequently  used  mathematical  programming  approach, 
proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), involving the use of linear 
programming  methods  to  construct  a  non-parametric  piece-wise  surface  (or 
frontier) over the data, and against which the efficiency is measured. 
 
The basic DEA frontier model is described as follows: 
 





v u x v
y u
, max  
subject to:  







          n i j ,... ,..., 2 , 1 =  
                                                  0 , ³ v u  
 
where ( ) , i i y x  is the input-output vector to be evaluated, and  ) , ( j j y x  is the input 
output vector of the jth production unit in the sample. The idea of this model is 
to estimate a set of non-negative weights that maximize the ratio of weighted  
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output-to-input ratio for the producer being evaluated. This ratio reflects how 
far the observed input-output vector is away from the production frontier. 
 
By  applying  DEA  techniques,  firms’  efficiency  index  is  estimated  for  the 
10-year period, and average and output-weighted average efficiency indexes are 
shown in Figure 2, which displays a tendency of divergence in firms’ efficiency 
over time. 
 



















3.3  The Contribution of Different Types of Firms to Output Growth 
 
This section first considers some simple decompositions of output change by 
firm size, and by firms’ ownership. It then looks into the contribution of young 
firms, defined as less than 5 years of age.  
 
Figure 3a depicts how various size classes contributed to output growth over the 
period 1987-1996. Two sub-periods are considered, corresponding to periods 
before and after the most recent set of reforms. Note that the contribution of 
small enterprises, while considerable, actually falls somewhat between the two 
sub-periods. This might indicate that successful small firms survive and develop 
into medium-sized firms. In fact, we do observe a relatively bigger contribution 






































Figure 3b examines the contribution of output growth by ownership type. The 
main point to note is that there was a big fall in the contribution of SOEs. This 
is mainly accounted for by the sharp rise in the contribution of foreign related 
ownership including investment from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan in the 
most recent period. 
 











Figure 3c focuses on the small firms themselves. Small firms’ main activity is 
mainly concentrated among Collectively Owned Enterprises (COEs), although 
foreign  firm  participation  and  other  types  have  latterly  become  much  more 
significant.   
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Now, let us turn to the contribution of young firms. For the period between 
1987 and 1996, firms under 5 years old accounted for around a third of the 
number of firms, yet less than 13% of employment. The larger contribution of 
younger  firms,  in  terms  of  number  of  firms,  indicates  that  those  firms  are 
usually small ones. They accounted for only around 10% of total employment 
and output, but their contributions seem to have been increasing since 1992. 
Compared with the average, they are more productive but less efficient.   
 
Table 2.  Performance of Young Firms (Age <5) 
                














1987    39.8    10.5    8.1    77.0    96.4 
1988    33.7    7.4    7.6    101.7    100.8 
1989    30.2    6.3    6.2    98.9    99.8 
1990    29.3    5.6    7.1    127.8    88.0 
1991    26.3    6.3    9.8    157.5    88.6 
1992    26.4    5.0    6.6    132.3    89.1 
1993    33.3    8.9    11.2    125.6    98.6 
1994    35.0    11.1    15.6    140.4    103.0 
1995    23.3    8.2    15.7    191.7    95.2 
1996    33.9    12.9    17.9    138.5    98.8 
   
The importance of young firms can be compared with the evidence from other 
countries.  Aw  et  al.  (1997)  report  that  in  nine  manufacturing  industries  in 
Taiwan one to five-year old firms account for approximately two-thirds of the 
number  of  firms  in  operation  and  between  one-third  and  one-half  of  each 
industry’s production in 1991. Roberts (1996) finds that the combined market 
share  of  one  to  five-year  old  plants  varies  between  18.3  and  20.8 per  cent, 
depending on the year for Colombian manufacturing plants. While for Chile, 
Tybout (1996) finds that one to five-year old plants account for 15.0 to 15.7 
percent of manufacturing output. For US manufacturing firms, Dunne, Roberts, 
and Samuelson (1988) find the market share of one to five-year old firms varies 
from 13.6 to 18.5, depending on the year. Hahn (2000) finds, in the context of 
Korean Manufacturing industry, that one to five-year old plants accounted for 
around 40% of the plant number, and 15% of output during the period between 
1995 and 1998. Thus, the importance of new firms in China seems to be less 
pronounced  than  that  in  both  advanced  economies  and  newly  developed 
economies, such as Taiwan and Korea.    
 
3.4  The Pattern of Entry and Exit of Different Types of Firms 
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Utilizing the longitudinal aspect of our data set, we can define surviving firms, 
entrants, and exiting firms. Here we adopted the definition of surviving firms, 
entrants, and exiting firm by Dunne et al. (1988). For the period between year 
k t -  and year t, an entrant is defined as the firm that appears in the last year (t), 
but not in the first year ( k t - ), an exit is defined as the firm that appears in the 
first year ( k t - ), but not in the last year (t). A surviving firm is defined as the 
one that appears both in the first year ( k t - ) and the last year (t) of the period. 
Under such definitions, all firms that entered before the last year of the given 
period are regarded as entrants and all firms that exited after the first year are 
regarded as exitors. We define the following variables: 
 
= ) (t NE number of firms that enter the industry between years  k t - and t; 
= ) (t NT total number of firms in the industry in the year t. 
= - ) ( k t NX number of firms that exits the industry between years  k t - and t 
= ) (t QE total output of firms that enter the industry between years  k t - and t 
= ) (t QT total output of all firms in the industry in year t 
= ) (t QX total  year  k t - output  of  firms  that  exit  the  industry  between  years 
k t - and t 
 
The  entry  and  exit  rate  for  the  industry  between  years  k t -   and  t  are  thus 
defined as: 
 
) ( / ) ( ) (
) ( / ) ( ) (
k t NT k t NX k t XR
k t NT t NE t ER




where  ) (t ER  is entry rate and  ) ( k t XR - is exit rate between years  k t -  and t. 
 
In order to look at the contributions of new entrants and exits to industry output, 
we define the market shares of firms that enter or exit between the years  k t -  
and t as: 
 
   
) ( / ) ( ) (
) ( / ) ( ) (
k t QT k t QX k t XSH
t QT t QE t ESH




where  ) (t ESH  is the market share of new entries and  ) ( k t XSH -  is the market 
share of exiting firms.  
 
The entry of new firms in China takes various forms, such as the entry of both 
domestic private and foreign-owned firms, the entry of new COEs including 
TVEs  (Township  and  Village  Enterprises),  and  the  entry  of  new  SOEs.  In  
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addition to these, some established firms might enter the electrical engineering 
sector by switching from other manufacturing sectors; however as we focus on 
this single electrical engineering industry, we do not distinguish between the 
switches and the new entries. The number of new entries and the entry rates in 
each year are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  The Number of Entries in Electrical Engineering Industry from 1988-1996 
 
Share of New Entries (%)     
 
Total Number 









1988  195    99.5    3.1    95.9  0 
1989  205    99.5    6.3    93.2  0.5 
1990  213    99.5   10.8    88.7  0.5 
1991  170    99.4    8.8    90.0  1.2 
1992  333    99.7    8.7    89.2  2.1 
1993  536    98.3    5.2    89.0  5.8 
1994  320    98.4    3.4    83.1  13.4 
1995  472    97.7    5.9    87.3  6.8 
1996  634    97.8    9.8    81.5  8.7 
 
Most of the new entries are small firms and COEs, accounting for more than 
97%, and 80% of new entries respectively.  
 
Table 4.  The Entry Rate (%) in Electrical Engineering Industry, 1988-1996 
 










1988  16.0  17.2  4.5  19.8  0.0 
1989  16.5  17.1  9.4  18.7  10.0 
1990  16.3  16.9  15.4  17.4  9.1 
1991  13.2  13.7  8.9  13.5  16.7 
1992  23.5  24.5  17.7  26.6  28.0 
1993  35.4  36.6  15.3  39.4  51.7 
1994  24.0  24.9  6.5  20.7  48.9 
1995  35.4  36.6  21.5  36.9  45.7 
1996  38.8  40.0  36.9  38.5  45.5 
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Firms  in  this  dataset  have  shown  an  increasing  entry  rate  after  1992.  For 
example, between 1988 and 1991, the entry rate ranges between 13.2% and 
16.7%; and between 1992 and 1996, the entry rate ranges between 23.5% and 
38.8%. The entry of non-public ownership (Others) is the most significant after 
1992, ranging between 28% and 51.7%.  
 
There are many reasons for firms to exit this particular electrical engineering 
sector as well. First, the owner(s), either government department in terms of 
SOEs, the community in terms of COEs or privates in terms of both foreign and 
domestic  private-owned  enterprises,  may  decide  to  close  down  an 
under-performing enterprise. Second, firms exit due to merger and acquisition. 
The  bureaucratic  overhead  of  the  enterprises  may  decide  to  merge  a 
poor-performing  enterprise  with  a  successful  one,  aiming  to  save  poor 
performing  enterprise  from  bankruptcy.  The  mergers  may  also  happen 
voluntarily without the interference of the government.  A third reason is the 
change of ownership, which takes various forms: such as joint ventures where 
foreign capital dominates, firms being sold out to the public, firms being sold 
out to individuals, and firms being sold out to employees and management. The 
fourth  reason  is  that  firms  switch  to  another  manufacturing  industry.  The 
number of exits and the exit rate in each year for the period between 1988 and 
1996 are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Table 5.  The Number of Exits in Electronic Engineering Industry from 1988-1996 
 











1988  117  99.1  5.1  94.0  0 
1989  134  100.0  2.2  97.8  0 
1990  150  100.0  6.7  93.3  0 
1991  187  99.5  11.8  88.2  0 
1992  207  100.0  5.3  94.7  0 
1993  450  99.1  9.3  89.6  1.1 
1994  502  98.2  9.0  88.0  3.0 
1995  329  98.8  5.8  84.5  8.5 
1996  343  97.4  7.6  87.5  5.0 
 
Again most of the exits are small firms and COEs, accounting for more than 
97% and 84% of exits respectively. 
  
  14
Table 6.  The Exit Rate (%) in Electronic Engineering Industry, 1988-1996 
 










1988  10.7  11.0  4.5  11.7  0.0 
1989  11.5  11.9  2.2  12.8  0.0 
1990  12.0  12.5  6.7  12.9  0.0 
1991  14.3  14.8  13.1  14.6  0.0 
1992  16.0  16.8  6.7  17.6  0.0 
1993  31.7  33.0  23.0  33.3  20.0 
1994  33.2  34.3  26.6  34.4  25.0 
1995  24.6  25.7  14.6  24.9  31.8 
1996  25.7  26.5  20.2  26.5  24.3 
 
Similarly, we also observe an increasing exit rate after 1992. In 1988, only 
10.7% of firms exited, but in 1994 around a third of the firms exited. The firm 
exit rate among new entries is even higher than the exit rate among all firms, 
which will be discussed in the following section. However, the pace of exit 
among SOEs is 6%-11% below that of the population average, except in 1991. 
 
As that in developed economies, the entry rate and exit rate seem to be highly 
correlated. However, entry rates are higher than exit rates in general. This is 
consistent with the growing feature of the electrical engineering sector and the 
whole Chinese economy. The fact that the paces of both entry and exit have 
accelerated since 1992 corresponds to the positive effects of the accelerating 
pace of economic reform since 1992.    
 

















In order to quantify the contribution of entrants and exits to output growth, we 
conduct some simple decompositions of output change by firm types and in 
terms  of  survivorship.  The  results  are  shown  in  Figure  4,  which  shows  the 
contribution of entry, exit, and surviving firms to the growth of output for the 
whole period and the two sub-periods. 
 
Figure 5a suggests that there was a big increase in the importance of “churning” 
of enterprises between the two sub-periods with both the positive contribution 
of entry and the negative contribution of “exit” increasing substantially. Indeed, 
in the period since the reforms, the net impact of entry and exit is clearly more 
important than the growth of surviving firms.  
 












Figure  5b  concentrates  on  the  small  firm  sector.  It  shows  that  a  similar 
phenomenon was also occurring here, with big increases in the role of both 
entry and exit.  
 




















































3.5  Productivity and Efficiency Differential among Entering, Exiting and Continuing 
Firms 
 
In order to identify the relationship between firm productivity, firm efficiency 
and firm turnover patterns, we compare efficiency and productivity levels of 
continuing  firms,  entrants,  and  exiting  plants  at  the  time  of  entry  and  exit. 
Table 7  shows  the  relative  productivity  and  efficiency  levels  of  entrants, 
survival and exit firms (relative to the productivity and efficiency levels of all 
firms) in electrical engineering industry at a given year.  
 
Table 7.  Average Productivity and Efficiency Index of Entrants, Exits and Survival Firms 
Relative to Population Average (%) 
 













1987        65.8  98.4  100.7  100.0 
1988  50.3  105.8  51.1  103.7  101.1  99.7 
1989  112.8  105.6  55.5  96.6  101.7  100.4 
1990  56.0  101.6  45.2  98.1  102.2  100.4 
1991  90.8  100.9  46.0  93.1  104.5  101.1 
1992  59.8  101.2  74.7  99.6  103.2  87.3 
1993  87.5  105.9  61.4  97.2  110.4  101.3 
1994  110.8  105.6  83.5  99.8  103.3  100.6 
1995  102.2  99.6  79.0  94.0  102.5  101.7 
1996  81.2  101.7           
 
The  main  features  of  Table 7  are  summarized  as  follows.  First,  exitors  in  a 
given  year  are,  on  average,  less  productive  and  less  efficient  than  both 
continuing firms and new entries in that year. Exitors are generally more than 
20% less productive than continuing firms. This result is consistent with the 
prediction by models of firm heterogeneity that market selection forces sort out 
low-productivity plants from high-productivity firms. Second, new entries are 
on  average  less  productive  than  continuing  firms  in  the  first  year  they  are 
observed except in 1989, 1994 and 1995; however, of all the new entries in 
these  three  years,  only  around  10%  of  them  have  above  average  labour 
productivity. New entries are the most efficient. Initial low productivity of new 
firms  relative  to continuing  firms  is  not  consistent  with  the presence of  the 
simple  vintage  effect  that  new  firms  are  more  productive  than  older  firms. 
However, it is not necessarily contradictory to the prediction of several recent 
models of firm dynamics, such as Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992). 
Potential entrants who are uncertain about their productivity but hold a positive 
outlook  on  their  post-entry  productivity  performance  -  i.e.  who  expect  they  
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could catch up with the incumbents in terms of productivity sooner or later - 
might  enter  despite  their  initially  low  productivity.  Of  course,  new  firms 
themselves are also heterogeneous in terms of productivity, as will be discussed 
later.  Initial  low  productivity  of  new  firms  relative  to  incumbents  is  also 
documented  by  other  studies,  such  as  Aw  et  al.  (1997)
1  for  Taiwanese 
manufacturing  industries,  and  Foster  et  al.  (1998)
2  for  US  manufacturing 
industry. 
 
Also from the Table 7 we can see that the productivity gap between new entries 
and continuing firms tends to become narrow. This fact on one hand conforms 
well with the presumption of recent R&D-based endogenous growth models, 
such  as  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991),  that  potential  entrants  receive 
externality from previous innovation. On the other hand, it reflects the fact that 
many new entrants are actually privatised continuing firms. 
 
The above discussion suggests that observed patterns of firm turnovers in the 
electrical engineering sector reflect the underlying productivity and efficiency 
differential,  indicating  the  functioning  of  the  competitive  selection  process 
within China. Lower productivity and efficiency of exitors relative to continuing 
firms and new firms is consistent with the prediction of theoretical models. Yet, 
the relative lower productivity of new entries relative to continuing firms casts 
doubt on the aggregate productivity gain from new entries.  
 
 
4.  Market Selection Process: Longitudinal Performance of Surviving  
  and Exiting Firms 
 
In this section, we examine whether the market selection forces have in fact 
sought  out  low  productivity  and  inefficient  firms  among  new  entrants,  and 
promote the growth of successful new entrants. By focusing on the behaviour of 
both entry cohorts and exit cohorts, we first examine the post entry performance 
of  survival  firms,  secondly  we  examine  the  pre-exit  performance  of  exiting 
firms, and finally we examine the performance of survival firms.  
 
4.1  Post Entry Performance of Survival Firms 
In our sample, there are nine cohorts of new firms according to birth years, 1988 
to  1996.  Focusing  on  a  particular  birth-year  cohort  has  the  advantage  that 
possible age effects and reform effects on survival are controlled for. Table 8 
presents  the  market  shares,  average  sizes  of  surviving  firms,  relative  labour 
productivity and efficiency, and failure rate for each entry cohort in each year.  
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  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
£1987    95.9    92.4   89.4   86.5   80.2   69.4   59.2   46.5    36.4 
1988 Entry    4.1    3.4   3.5   2.9   2.9   1.6   1.4   1.0    1.1 
1989 Entry      4.3   5.2   6.5   6.8   7.4   8.9   9.5    7.2 
1990 Entry        1.8   1.7   2.2   1.6   1.5   0.8    0.7 
1991 Entry          2.6   3.4   2.3   2.1   1.8    2.2 
1992 Entry            7.2   6.5   5.2   4.3    1.7 
1993 Entry              13.2   12.0   11.5    15.5 
1994 Entry                11.4   8.2    11.0 
1995 Entry                  17.6    20.6 
1996 Entry                    14.7 
                   
Average Size
4 of Surviving Firms Relative to All Firms in the Industry (%) 
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
£1987    107.8   125.4   139.7   146.2   150.1   185.9   205.5   232.6    290.4 
1988 Entry    49.4   46.7   55.2   52.5   74.1   95.2   69.0   76.5    110.6 
1989 Entry      23.0   28.3   39.2   46.8   34.5   109.3   145.8    194.3 
1990 Entry        20.0   21.3   28.0   30.1   30.2   32.7    32.5 
1991 Entry          21.7   30.2   46.8   51.7   46.0    50.3 
1992 Entry            51.1   65.5   74.4   84.5    87.9 
1993 Entry              42.7   39.1   44.6    66.3 
1994 Entry                42.8   40.3    59.0 
1995 Entry                  48.8    62.0 
1996 Entry                    70.3 
                   
Average Labour Productivity Relative to All Firms in the Industry (%)   
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
£1987   104.5   101.7  101.1   99.9  101.8   99.2   89.4   76.9    69.4 
1988 Entry    50.3   61.7   69.3   64.1   54.7   41.5   64.1   56.0    54.8 
1989 Entry      112.8  152.7   175.3  171.2   227.6   222.0   222.9   186.4 
1990 Entry        56.0   65.2   84.7   102.0   129.1   97.8   110.1 
1991 Entry          90.8  118.3   89.6   88.2   124.8   181.7 
1992 Entry            59.8   73.6   62.2   64.3    64.5 
1993 Entry              87.5   134.6   199.5   222.2 
1994 Entry                110.8   180.2   245.0 
1995 Entry                  102.2   132.6 
1996 Entry                    81.2 
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Table 8.   Market Shares, Average Firm Sizes, Productivity and Exit Rates of Entry Cohorts 
(continued) 
 
Average Efficiency Index Relative to all Firms in the Industry (%) 
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
£1987    99.0   97.4   98.3   96.8   96.6   95.2   91.3   89.3    85.9 
1988 Entry   105.8   109.8   107.2  107.1   106.1  103.6   94.8   100.1    90.9 
1989 Entry      105.6   102.6   99.9   99.4   92.7   98.2   89.4    99.4 
1990 Entry        101.6  113.1   110.6   99.5   135.3   95.8   109.0 
1991 Entry         100.9   104.9  102.7   103.4   80.8    94.8 
1992 Entry            101.2  100.9   92.1   95.0    83.6 
1993 Entry             105.9   107.3   133.8   105.4 
1994 Entry                105.6   94.2   110.6 
1995 Entry                  99.6   108.0 
1996 Entry                   101.7 
                   
Entry Cohort Exit Rates (%) 
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
£1987    10.7   7.5   8.2   7.6   2.7   24.5   24.6   19.1    15.5 
1988 Entry      25.1   17.1   6.6   11.5   40.0   31.7   24.4    6.5 
1989 Entry        22.4   23.3   0.8   37.2   35.5   20.4    30.8 
1990 Entry          25.8   17.7   40.0   34.6   35.3    24.2 
1991 Entry            20.6   37.8   28.6   31.7    19.5 
1992 Entry              39.0   26.6   29.5    29.5 
1993 Entry                43.3   43.1    17.3 
1994 Entry                  53.1    31.3 
1995 Entry                    28.2 
 
From the above table we should note the significant role played by firms set up 
before 1987; in 1992 these firms account for 80% of the gross industry output, 
and by  1996 they still account for  more than a third of the gross industrial 
output. In fact, it is only since 1995 that the contribution of these firms reduced 
to less than 50%. This suggests that firms set up before 1987 have been an 
important  stabilizing  factor  in  Chinese  economy,  at  least  in  Chinese 
manufacturing industries.   
 
Another feature is that the market share of each entry cohort following entry 
tends to decline as the cohort ages, on average. For example, the market share of 
1988 entry cohort is 4.1% in 1988, but this figure is only 1.1% in 1996. This 
decline in market share is the result of two processes: the change in the size of 
surviving firms in the cohort, and the exit of firms from this cohort.  In order to 
examine the former, we summarize the average size of the surviving firms. The 
average firm size within each cohort increases relative to the industry average as 
the cohort ages.  For example, the average size of 1988 entry cohort is only  
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49.4% of industry average in 1988; by 1996 it is 10.6% bigger than the industry 
average. So survivors have grown and gained in size relative to incumbent firms 
in the competitive selection process.  
 
The  third  feature  to  be  noted  is  that  each  entry  cohort  shows  very  rapid 
productivity improvement following entry, and catches up with continuing firms 
in  productivity  level  after  several  years.  For  example,  the  productivity 
disadvantage of 1988 entry cohort relative to1987 survival cohort is about 50%; 
by 1996 this figure narrows to 20%.  And for some other entry cohorts, their 
productivity  even  surpasses  that  of  1987  survival  cohort  in  1996.  Thus,  the 
results are supportive of the presence of rapid learning by surviving members of 
births, especially during the first several years after entry.   
 
In terms of efficiency, on average, entry cohort tends to be more efficient than 
1987 survival cohort. However, the efficiency of entry cohorts tends to decrease 
as entry cohorts age, which is probably due to the entry of newer firms, and 
newer technologies. Entry cohort tends to have a higher failure rate in the first 
few years after entry, and the failure rates for all entry cohorts increased since 
1993.  
 
4.2  Pre-exit Performance of Exit Firms 
In this section, we examine the pre-exit performance of exit firms in order to 
understand another dynamic aspect of the market selection process: exit. Table 
9 presents the average performance (productivity, efficiency and firm size) for 
each exit cohort in each year before their exits.  
 
Table 9 shows clearly that, for each exit cohort reported here, exiting firms are 
both less productive and less efficient than surviving firms at the time of exit, 
and they are much smaller in firm size. In fact, the performance differences 
between exiting firms and surviving firms are highly significant. For example, 
the surviving firms are 50% to 100% more productive than exitors depending on 
exit year. And average firm size of surviving firms is between 1.5 and 5 times 
bigger than that of exitors depending on exit year. Thus, the results strengthen 
the  conclusion  we  drew  earlier  that  markets  sort  out  firms  on  the  basis  of 
productivity. 
 
Moreover, the productivity differences occur not just at the time of exit, in fact 
these differences exist for years before exit. This suggests that firm exits reflect 
underlying productivity differences that have existed for quite a period of time. 
For example, for 1996 exit cohort, the productivity disadvantage relative to the 
surviving  group  is  about  25 per  cent  in  1995.  However,  the  productivity  
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differential goes back as early as 1990, when the productivity disadvantage was 
already 10 per cent. Similar results hold for other death cohorts. Thus, firms’ 
exit seems to reflect not only point-in-time productivity disadvantage around 
exit but also persistent bad productivity performance. 
 
Table 9.  Productivity, Efficiency and Firm Size of Exit Cohorts By Year 
 
Average Labour Productivity Pre-Exit Relative to All Firms(%) 
  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
1988 Exit    65.8                 
1989 Exit    39.9    51.1               
1990 Exit    43.6    65.1    45.0             
1991 Exit    57.3    67.3    49.5    45.2           
1992 Exit    43.4    52.4    37.7    36.4    46.0         
1993 Exit    42.3    57.8    42.3    63.9    70.5    74.7       
1994 Exit    59.8    61.8    38.0    62.5    58.1    65.8    61.4     
1995 Exit    96.4   154.1   122.9    78.4    71.1    80.2    80.2    83.5   
1996 Exit   149.1   114.5    82.0   112.7    97.4    83.8    95.4    97.3    79.0 
Survivor
5   126.4   116.8    82.0   124.1   121.6   115.7   116.0   104.6   102.5 
                   
Average Efficiency Index Pre-Exit Relative to all Firms (%) 
  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
1988 Exit    98.4                 
1989 Exit   105.7   103.7               
1990 Exit    99.0    99.7    94.0             
1991 Exit   101.3    96.9    99.6    98.1           
1992 Exit    96.9    94.0    95.6    96.7    93.1         
1993 Exit   101.7   102.4   100.8   105.0   101.6    99.6       
1994 Exit    92.9    91.5    93.2    97.4    96.2    96.5    97.2     
1995 Exit    99.3   101.4    96.8    98.5   103.7    99.4   101.3    99.8   
1996 Exit    97.9    97.6    98.0    98.2   101.6    98.9   104.7   106.3    94.0 
Survivor   103.4   105.4    98.0   101.8   103.0   103.1   100.9    99.2   101.7 
                   
Average Firm Size of Pre-Exit Relative to All Firms (%) 
  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
1988 Exit    35.6                 
1989 Exit    23.9    18.6               
1990 Exit    44.5    34.2    30.9             
1991 Exit    35.2    34.3    30.9    26.5           
1992 Exit    87.3    67.5    64.4    63.5    40.0         
1993 Exit    46.4    51.1    47.2    39.2    38.9    35.9       
1994 Exit    76.4    77.8    85.2    73.3    64.8    68.8    63.4     
1995 Exit    74.7    75.2    75.6    70.7    69.2    64.8    50.3    71.5   
1996 Exit    81.0    95.3    86.3    82.8    82.9    83.7    66.9    51.8    47.0 
Survivor    215.3    211.6    211.5    222.7    217.1    200.5    160.2    146.7    117.0 
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Another feature demonstrated by table 9 is that the relative size of the pre-exit 
firms tends to decrease compared with the average size of the whole sample as 
they come to the point of exit. For example, for the 1996 exit cohort, their 
average firm size is 81% of that of the industrial average in 1987, and by 1995, 
a  year  before  their  exits,  their  average  size  is  only  47%  of  the  population 
average. Similar patterns are found for other death-year cohorts as well. 
 
4.3  Transition Matrix Analysis 
Up  until  now,  we  have  been  examining  firms’  post-entry  and  pre-exit 
performance  by  focusing  on  the  average  productivity  and  efficiency 
differentials among various entry and exit cohorts. In this section, we focus on 
the long run performance of survival firms by analysing the movement of firms 
across  productivity  and  efficiency  distribution  over  time.  One  way  of 
summarizing  the  above  features  of  our  data,  and  complement  our  previous 
analysis, is to rely on transition matrix analysis. Following Baily et al. (1992), 
we set up transition matrices for two time intervals, 1987-1992 and 1992-1996. 
In order to do this, the efficiency score and labour productivity of surviving 
firms within the industry are compared to the industrial average in the beginning 
and end years of each period, and firms are divided accordingly into 5 quintiles.  
 
For  example,  in  terms  of  productivity,  firms  are  divided  according  to  the 
following: 
 
  Quintile 1:  % 60 / ) ( ³ - P P P it  
  Quintile 2:  % 20 / ) ( % 60 ³ - > P P P it  
  Quintile 3:  % 20 / ) ( % 20 - ³ - > P P P it  
  Quintile 4:  % 60 / ) ( % 20 - ³ - > - P P P it  
  Quintile 5:  P P P it / ) ( % 60 - > -  
 
Then, for each quintile in 1987 and 1992, we calculate what fractions of those 
firms are in each quintile in 1992 and 1995 respectively, and what fractions 
have  exited.  The  transition  matrix  for  productivity  and  efficiency  for  each 
period are shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10.  Transition Matrix of Survival Firms 
 
 Relative Productivity Rankings (1987-1992) 
  1992 
  Number of Firms  Share (%) 
1987  1  2  3  4  5  Exit  Total  Up  Stable  Down  Exit 
1    46    14    24    14    13    10    121  0.0  38.0  53.7  8.3 
2    11    14    16    14    10    11    76  14.5  18.4  52.6  14.5 
3    16    17    33    61    25    40    192  17.2  17.2  44.8  20.8 
4    14    9    39    95    66    83    306  20.3  31.0  21.6  27.1 
5    6    5    9    30    49    166    265  18.9  18.5  0.0  62.6 
Total    93    59   121   214   163    310    960  16.3  24.7  26.8  32.3 
                       
Relative Productivity Rankings (1992-1996) 
  1996 
  Number of Firms  Share (%) 
1992  1  2  3  4  5  Exit  Total  Up  Stable  Down  Exit 
1    22    4    17    26    16    66    151  0.0  14.6  41.7  43.7 
2    5    1    10    13    19    51    99  5.1  1.0  42.4  51.5 
3    6    1    6    24    54    90    181  3.9  3.3  43.1  49.7 
4    2    3    3    16    95    262    381  2.1  4.2  24.9  68.8 
5    2    2    3    5    68    333    413  2.9  16.5  0.0  80.6 
Total    37    11    39    84   252    802   1225  2.6  9.2  22.7  65.5 
                       
Relative Efficiency Rankings (1992-1996) 
  1996 
  Number of Firms  Share (%) 
1992  1  2  3  4  5  Exit  Total  Up  Stable  Down  Exit 
1    1    3    7    1    0    28    40  0.0  2.5  27.5  70.0 
2    3    12    56    19    2    113    205  1.5  5.9  37.6  55.1 
3    10    23    97    86    14    429    659  5.0  14.7  15.2  65.1 
4    1    3    21    36    19    195    275  9.1  13.1  6.9  70.9 
5    0    0    3    3    0    11    17  35.3  0.0  0.0  64.7 
Total    61    58   101    88   120    776   1204  5.6  12.1  17.9  64.5 
 
Starting from the first row of table 10, of the firms that were in the top quintile 
in 1987, about 38 percent of them were again in the top quintile in 1992, and 
53.7%  of  firms  experienced  downward  movement  in  relative  productivity 
ranking, of which only 19% of firms moved down to the bottom two quintiles in 
1992. Among the firms that were in the second quintile in 1987, 18.4 % of them 
stayed in the second quintile and 14.5% of them moved up to the first quintile in 
1992,  and  again  more  than  50%  of  firms  moved  downwards  in  relative 
productivity  rankings.  In  total  24.7%  of  firms  moved  upwards  in  relative  
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ranking,  26.8%  stayed  in  the  same  quintile,  and  26.8%  of  firms  moved 
downwards.  
 
The high percentage of upward and stable movements of firms (about 41% of 
firms moved upwards and stayed in the same quintile) indicate the persistence 
of productivity. As expected, the percentage of exits conditional on the 1987 
productivity quintile gets higher as we go down the productivity quintiles. In the 
top quintile about 8.3 % of the firms exited within five years, while as much as 
62.6 % exited in the bottom quintile during the same period. One interesting 
observation here is that there are many high productivity exits. For the period of 
1992 to 1996, only less than 12% of firms moved upward or stayed in the same 
quintile, 22.7% of firms moved downward, and 65.5% of firms exited.  The 
percentage  of  exits  conditional  on  the  1992  productivity  quintile  becomes 
higher as well when we go down the productivity quintiles, but it is higher than 
that for the period between 1987 and 1992.  
 
In term of efficiency ranking, for the period between 1987 and 1992, 13.9% of 
firms moved upwards in relative efficiency ranking, 33.5% of firms stay in the 
same quintile, and 20.5 % move downwards. And for the period between 1992 
and 1996, only 5.6% of firms moved upwards, and 12.1% stayed in the same 
quintile.  In  terms  of  the  percentage  of  firm  exits  conditional  on  the  1987 
efficiency quintile, there is no significant difference among different quintiles. 
However, the percentage of firm exits conditional on 1992 efficiency quintile 
tends to get higher as we go down the efficiency quintiles.    
 
 
5.  Entry, Exit and Aggregate Productivity Growth 
 
Superficially, the evidence from the above sections suggests a sharpening of the 
competitive  process  over  the  period  under  investigation.  More  correctly, 
however, establishing the result depends on both the hazard represented by exit, 
and  the  competitiveness  of  new  entrants.  In  this  section,  we  evaluate  the 
competitiveness of the new entrants by examining the contributions of the entry 
and exit of firms, or more broadly, the resource reallocation among firms to 
aggregate productivity growth. We first examine the methods for productivity 
decomposition, and then we decompose the growth of labour productivity in the 
electrical engineering industry in Liao Ning province. 
 
5.1  Productivity Decomposition Methods 
There exist several alternative decomposition methods, and the decomposition 
results  are  sensitive  to  decomposition  methods  (see  Foster  et  al.  (1998),  
  25
Bartelsman  and  Doms  (2000)  Ahn  (2001)  for  a  general  review).  Aggregate 
productivity in a given sector is normally calculated as a weighted average of 




it t p P ∑ = q  
 
where  t P   is  an  aggregate  productivity  measure  (labour  productivity  or  total 
factor  productivity)  for  the  sector  at  time  t;  it q is  the  share  of  firm  i 
(employment share or output share) in the given sector at time  t; and  it p is the 
productivity measure of an individual firm i  at time t.  
 
Aggregate  productivity  changes  are  generally  decomposed  into  three 
components:  
 
i)  within-firm productivity changes in continuing firms;  
 
ii)  productivity  changes  resulting  from  changes  in  market  shares  of 
high-productivity firms and low-productivity firms; and  
 
iii)  productivity changes resulting from the process of entry and exit.  
 
Baily et al. (1992) used the following decomposition: 
 



























where  it q  is the output share of firm i in the given sector at time t; productivity 
growth ( t TFP ln D ) is measured between the base year  k t -   and the end year  t; 
and  C,  E  and  X   are  sets  of  continuing,  entering,  and  exiting  firms, 
respectively. 
 
A problem with the above decomposition method is that if the market share of 
the entrants is very low and if the market share of the exitors is very high, the 
net entry effect will be negative even when entrants are more productive than 
exitors (Haltiwanger, 1997). Furthermore, it doesn’t account for the cleansing 
effect of the exiting which sort out the low productivity firms. To overcome 
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where  t P D   refers  to  aggregate  productivity  changes  over  the  k -year  interval 
between the first year ( k t - ) and the last year (t);  it q  is the share of firm i in the 
given sector at time t; C, E, and  X  are sets of continuing, entering, and exiting 
firms, respectively; and  k t P-  is the aggregate productivity level of the sector as of 
the first year  k t - . Under this decomposition method, an entrant or exitor will 
contribute  positively  to  productivity  growth  when  it  has  higher  or  lower 
productivity than the initial industry average. The five components of the above 
decomposition are: the within-firm effect, the between-firm effect, the “cross 
effect”, the entry effect and the exit effects.  
 
Foster,  Haltiwanger  and  Krizan  (1998)  suggested  another  version  of 
decomposition, which is related to Haltiwanger (1997): 
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where a bar over a variable indicates the average of the variable over the base 
and end year. This method uses the time averages of the first and last years for 




5.2  Decomposition of Labour Productivity in Electrical Engineering Industry 
 
As we have discussed the methods of productivity decomposition, here we turn 
to  the  decomposition  of  aggregate  productivity  growth  in  the  context  of 
electrical engineering industry in Liao Ning Province and we focus on labour 
productivity.  Ideally  we  would  want  to  examine  total  factor  productivity, 
however  we  suspect  that,  within  a  specific  sector,  movements  in  labour 
productivity may represent a reasonable proxy for movements of total factor 
productivity. Moreover,  
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As we are more concerned about the contribution of new entries and exits to 
productivity  growth  than  the  contributions  of  survival  firms,  we  simply 
decompose  the  productivity  growth  into  the  productivity  growth  from  new 
entry, exitors and the survival firms, rather than decompose the contribution of 
survival firms into within-firm effect, between-firm effect, and the cross effect.  
We decompose the growth of labour productivity as follows: 
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q q   represents  the  change  of  labour 




q  represents the change of 
labour productivity attributed to new entry, and  ) ( P p k it
X i
k it - -
Î
- ∑q represents the 
change  of labour productivity due to firms’ exit. 
 
In practice, we divided the 10-year period between 1987 and 1996 into two 
sub-periods,  1987-1992  and  1992-1996.  We  first  decompose  the  labour 
productivity  growth  for  the  two  sub-periods,  then  decompose  the  labour 
productivity growth for the whole period between 1987 and 1996. The results of 
the decomposition are shown in Figures 6a and 6b. 
 










































Figure  6a shows the  contribution  of  entry,  exit,  and  survival  to  the  sector’s 
productivity  growth.  It  suggests  that  all  three  (on  average)  made  positive 
contributions  to  productivity  growth  over  both  periods.  However  the  major 
impact comes from entrants, with only a limited part played by survival and 
exits. Exits do appear to have increased their role a little over the sub-periods, 
but there is clearly no obvious impact on the contribution of survivors. Looking 
solely at the contribution of small enterprises to overall productivity growth, 
Figure 6b suggests that survival is even less important among small firms, while 




6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have attempted to examine aspects of the competitive selection 
process in an important sector of Chinese manufacturing, looking in particular 
for changes resulting from the latest stage of reform, dubbed the transition to the 
"socialist  market  economy".  These  dynamic  processes  may  be  becoming 
increasingly  important  for  the  continuing  growth  of  manufacturing  as  the 
agricultural sector, as a source of surplus labour, begins to decline.  
 
Our analysis suggests that the competitive selection process is taking shape in 
China, with new firm entries contributing substantially to both output growth 
and  productivity  growth,  however  old  firm  is  still  an  important  stabilizing 
element in determining the trend of the economy. Our analysis also suggests 
that it is insufficient to analyse the competitive process from the point of view 
of new firm entry and incumbent firm growth alone. Indeed the substantial rate 
of churning of enterprises that we observe in this sector means that a study of 
exit is just as important as that of entry. Moreover this rate of churning appears 
to  have  increased  substantially  in  the  latest  phase  of  reform.  In  fact  our 
productivity  decomposition  suggests  that  exits  do  contribute  to  productivity 
improvement especially within the small firm. Our analysis suggests that, for 
small firms and COEs, the competitive selection process operates much as we 
would expect it to in a private market economy. However, for SOEs, the rate of 
exit is much slower, and compared with new entry the contribution of exit to 





















1   Aw et al. (1997) reported that entrants in 1986 are, depending on 
industry, between 0.6 per cent and 6.9 per cent less productive than 
incumbent firms in the same year. 
 
2   Foster et al. (1998) report that, in terms of labour productivity, entering 
plants have lower productivity than continuing plants even at ten-year 
intervals. 
 
3   Market share is calculated as the share of firms’ sale to aggregate sale. 
 
4   Average Size is calculated as the average employment. 
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